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Abstract
The point of this Essay is to examine the role of economic sanctions, particularly those taken
unilaterally by the United States, in influencing the development of human rights policies world-
wide. In some cases those unilateral sanctions are imposed without considering cultural differ-
ences behind the human rights themselves. In other instances, the United States fails to consider
the effectiveness of those sanctions. In still other situations, the United States fails to realize
important self-determination issues or the idea of participating in the broader international com-
munity. In all cases, the United States, in its role as international arbiter of human rights, needs to
be aware of blinding influences that can obscure its vision of the larger picture.
ESSAY
HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS: THE NEW IMPERIALISM
Christopher Wall*
Then I noticed a small sketch in oils, on a panel, representing
a woman, draped and blindfolded, carrying a lighted torch.'
INTRODUCTION
One hundred years ago, Joseph Conrad described a world
not too dissimilar from our own. He saw a world in which
wealthy nations in the name of civilization took advantage of
less-developed nations to accomplish their own economic ends.
One of the most striking symbols in Heart of Darkness is Conrad's
description of a painting that depicts a blindfolded woman hold-
ing a lighted torch. The painting's message is one of hypocrisy
and irony: while she herself is blinded, the bearer of light pro-
fesses to enlighten. The times and some of the players have
changed, but the general story line remains much the same.
The United States is arguably the most powerful and influ-
ential nation in the world today. It uses, however, a limited
range of economic actions to police human rights in other coun-
tries.2 Those actions, taken with a nod toward international
* LL.M., 1998, University of Durham (England); J.D., 1997, Brigham Young Uni-
versity; B.A., 1995, Brigham Young University. The author recognizes the rapidly
changing nature of this area of international law and notes that the material contained
herein is current as of September 1, 1998.
1. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS 40 (Bantam Books, 1981).
2. According to USAEngage, a coalition of U.S. businesses, as ofJune 1, 1998, the
United States had imposed unilateral economic sanctions upon at least 74 countries,
including Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Be-
larus, Belize, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, the Democratic Re-
public of Congo, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-
duras, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon,
Liberia, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma),
the New Independent States of the former Soviet Union, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan,
Uganda, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet-
nam, Yemen, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The United States was also con-
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human rights standards, are of no small impact, both upon the
economies of those countries that the economic sanctions are
meant to influence, and upon the United States' economy it-
self.3 Between 1993 and 1996 alone, the United States used eco-
nomic sanctions sixty-one times as its preferred human rights po-
licing tool-more than one half the total number of times sanc-
tions had been imposed since the end of World War II.' For
better or for worse, around the globe the United States uses its
economic brawn to bring other nations into line with its human
rights policies.
The United States' power to influence is almost unequaled
in the world today, and if the number of economic sanctions
imposed is any indication of the number of human rights viola-
tions occurring worldwide, then much of the world has a long
way to go before meeting Western human rights standards. But
those Western standards are just that: Western standards. Where
does this drive to be the "bearer of light" come from? Former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter offered this explanation for the
United States' assumption of the leadership position:
With the end of the Cold War, we in the United States no
longer face intense competition with a powerful Soviet Union
for hegemony or influence in almost every region of the
world. There is a void in international leadership, which of-
fers us a comparatively blank slate on which to imprint the
finest aspects of our nation's ideals.5
While many nations may indeed look to the United States
sidering imposing sanctions upon Indonesia, Switzerland, and Turkey. See U.S. Unilat-
eral Economic Sanctions (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://www.usaengage.org/resources/
map2.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
3. Economic sanctions put a multi-billion-dollar dent every year in the U.S. econ-
omy. According to the Institute for International Economics, in 1995 alone, unilateral
sanctions cost the U.S. economy an estimated US$15 to US$19 billion and up to
260,000 jobs. See Thomas Omestad, Addicted to Sanctions, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 15, 1998, at 30; see also US Acknowledges Disarray in Sanctions Policy, APW1RE, Jan. 8,
1998 (citing recent official estimates of cost of economic sanctions to U.S. economy at
US$15 billion in lost export sales and up to 250,000 U.S. jobs).
4. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Under Secretary for Economic, Agricultural, and Business
Affairs, Remarks before the North American Committee of the National Policy Associa-
tion, Washington, D.C., Jan. 7, 1998 (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/
www/policy.remarks/1998/980107_eizenpolicyassoc.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal) [hereinafter Eizenstat].
5. Excerpts from Carter's "Living Faith," NEWS OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Nov. 17,
1996, at E3.
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for leadership in forming and implementing their human rights
policies, a fundamental difference exists between various states
looking toward the U.S. torch for enlightenment and having that
torch thrown at them.
The point of this Essay is to examine the role of economic
sanctions, particularly those taken unilaterally by the United
States, in influencing the development of human rights policies
worldwide. In some cases those unilateral sanctions are imposed
without considering cultural differences behind the human
rights themselves. In other instances, the United States fails to
consider the effectiveness of those sanctions. In still other situa-
tions, the United States fails to realize important self-determina-
tion issues or the idea of participating in the broader interna-
tional community. In all cases, the United States, in its role as
international arbiter of human rights, needs to be aware of
blinding influences that can obscure its vision of the larger pic-
ture.
I. ESTABLISHING HUMAN RIGHTS
[A] s long as there was a piece of paper written over in accord-
ance with some farcical law or other made down the river, it
didn't enter anybody's head to trouble how they would live.'
Before discussing the means by which the United States at-
tempts to enforce human rights, it is helpful to examine those
rights themselves. The U.N. Universal of Human Rights (the
"Universal Declaration"), adopted in 1948, is the world's seminal
human rights document and is meant to be a "common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations."7 The Universal
Declaration was a precursor to individual regional covenants,
and while not meant necessarily as a legally binding instrument
itself, the Universal Declaration was a statement of principle and
a foundation upon which the signatories could build.' The Uni-
versal Declaration has since given rise to dozens of regional trea-
6. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 68.
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., pmbl. cl.1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
8. HENRYJ. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
119-20 (1996). The Universal Declaration of Human. Rights ("Universal Declaration"
or "Declaration") was meant "to precede more detailed and comprehensive provisions"
and would be a "springboard" for other treaties. Id.
19981
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ties, conventions, and resolutions.9 All of those treaties and con-
ventions came into being as a result of the notion that if human
rights are articulated and reduced to writing, "that piece of pa-
per written over in accordance with some farcical law" will
soothe the people of the world so that it need not enter anyone's
head to trouble about how they would live. But while such writ-
ings, conventions, and treaties make states' human rights ideals
clear, the writings are less clear when it comes to implementa-
tion of those ideals.10 The Universal Declaration's statement of
high ideals does not include any language providing enforce-
ment mechanisms for those ideals, nor do the regional treaties
and covenants include enforcement mechanisms.11 While some
9. The list of such treaties, conventions, and resolutions is extensive. Over 70 legal
instruments are in force today, including, but not limited to the Slavery Convention of
1926, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253; the 1948 American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International
Conference of American States, art. III, in 1 ANNALS ORGANIZATION AM. STS. 130, 130
(1949); the Universal Declaration, supra note 7; the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951); the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"), Nov. 4,1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter ECHR]; the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, opened for
signature Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force Jan. 7,
1954); the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, E.S.C. Res.
663C, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957), amended
by E.S.C. Res. 2076, U.N. ESCOR, 62d Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988
(1977); the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 13, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered
into force Jan. 4, 1969); the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360; the Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; the Optional Proto-
col to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 302, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967); the American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, chs. VII-VIII, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970)
(entered into force July 18, 1978); the African Charter on Human and People's Rights,
opened for signature June 26, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59
(1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986). See GuIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RGHTS
PRAcriCEs 3-17 (H. Hannum ed., 1983).
10. Human rights enshrined in the Declaration are meant to be "objectively uni-
versal in nature" and are intended to be applied as a minimum standard around the
world. Regional treaties and covenants may supplement the universal rules, so long as
they do not violate the spirit of the universal rules. Gabriel M. Wilner, The Status &
Future of the Customary International Law of Human Rights: Reflections on Regional Human
Rights Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 407, 418-19 (1996).
11. Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic
Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 1, 15-16 (1996) (noting that none of regional human rights conventions specif-
ically provides for specific means of enforcement of human rights).
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conventions do provide for reports, they do not provide means
of redress should those reports be negative.12 Without clearly
defined enforcement provisions, the burden of enforcement has
been assumed by states such as the United States so as to protect
the human rights that the Universal Declaration and its progeny
sets forth.
The lack of clear enforcement procedures is perhaps best
accounted for by the same notion that gave rise to the conven-
tions' and treaties' existence: the simple articulation of a law
prohibiting a particular act will lead to the eventual disappear-
ance of that act. Essentially, that is why laws are made.13 Yet,
even if those human rights are spelled out with indubitable clar-
ity and absolute universality, the elimination of certain human
rights violations almost certainly requires some form of deter-
rent. Until such deterrent or police power exists on an interna-
tional scale, no truly universal change of action may take place. 14
Without enforcement, the Universal Declaration remains but a
descriptive statement of lofty ambitions, lacking a workable
scheme for its implementation. In fact, in the fifty years since its
adoption, the Universal Declaration appears to be "little more
than a paper promise" for the world's population, lacking any
teeth for its implementation."5 Some have even called the Uni-
12. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 9, art. 16(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 9, 6 I.L.M. at 365; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 40-41, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 181-82, 6 I.L.M.
368, 378-79.
13. One author has noted that "[r]ights are physically embodied in court decisions
or statutes, treaties, or conventions. They are made real through the language of law,
politics, and diplomacy, collectively, if ambivalently, believed." Elizabeth K. Spahn,
Waiting for Credentials: Feminist Theories of Enforcement of International Human Rights, 44
AM. U. L. REv. 1053, 1056 (1995).
14. The Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the European and American conventions include some scheme for
enforcement, as does the United Nation's Human Rights Commission. The deterrent
effect of these schemes is largely normative in approach. Louis Henkin, International
Law: Politics, Values & Functions, in STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 352.
15. Declaration of Rights Little Help; Amnesty International Says Abuses Continue, SALT
LAKE TRiB., June 18, 1998, at A5 [hereinafter Declaration of Rights Little Help]; see Joy
Gordon, The Concept of Human Rights: The History & Meaning of Its Politicization, 23
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 689 (1998) (noting debate over how far notion of human rights
should be interpreted); Courtney W. Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism
to the Liberty and Equality Rights of Women: An Aralysis Under the United Nations Charter, 35
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271 (1997) (noting difficulties in reconciling religious belief
with human rights).
1998]
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versal Declaration "the world's best-kept secret,"16 even though
most of the world's governments have agreed to promote the
rights espoused therein wherever possible.
The Universal Declaration declares that recognition of a
human right is the "recognition of the inherent dignity and of
the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family. ' 17 But if human rights, and in particular those defined in
the Universal Declaration, are to be truly "universal," and thus
universally enforced, then there ought to be little objection to
review a signatory state's action for compliance with that stan-
dard. But objection there is, for not only is the interpretation,
weight, and scope of such rights almost certain to vary from state
to state, but even if those rights were uniformly interpreted and
applied, it is unclear whether any signatory state would want any
other nation or body of nations to be the arbiter of how that
state has acted with regard to those rights."i
Besides being embodied in the Universal Declaration itself,
many of the same rights and freedoms are enshrined constitu-
tionally by most of the world's sovereign states. The Iranian
Constitution, for example, establishes a democratic form of gov-
ernment and provides for presidential and parliamentary elec-
tions by direct and secret ballots. 9 The Chinese Constitution, in
its first forty-nine articles, invokes more rights than are pro-
nounced in the United States Constitution and provides for
many of the same rights proclaimed in the Universal Declara-
16. See Declaration of Rights Little Help, supra note 15, at A5.
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, pmbl. cl. 1.
18. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost
of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995) (noting hesitance of United States to
bind itself to any international jurisdiction, particularly that of International Court of
Justice ("ICJ")); PAUL P. CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EC LAw: TEXT, CASES & MATERI-
ALS 309 (1997) (noting that even within supranational European Community, interpre-
tation of meaning and scope of fundamental rights varies from Member State to Mem-
ber State and that it is unlikely that any Member State would be keen to have European
Court of Justice judge that Member State's actions according to such unclear set of
rights and principles).
19. QANUN-E ASASI-YEJOMHURI-YI ESLAMI-YE [Constitution] arts. 6, 62 (Iran) (stating
that "the affairs of the country must be administered on the basis of public opinion
expressed by the means of elections, including the election of the President, the repre-
sentatives of the National Consultative Assembly, and the members of councils, or by
means of referenda in matters specified in other articles of this Constitution" and that
"[t]he Islamic Consultative Assembly is constituted by the representatives of the people
elected directly and by secret ballot.").
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tion, including a prohibition on minority discrimination,20 a
right to free speech,21 freedom of religion, and a freedom of
privacy and correspondence. 23
While the Universal Declaration and many states' constitu-
tions invoke the name of human rights, what is actually occur-
ring "is ... not the emergence of a general, extensive, uniform
consistent, settled practice accompanied by the more or less
gradual building up of an opinion Juris." 24 Without an opinion
juris and a uniform body of case law, there can be no real "hard"
law with regard to human rights. Rather, what is occurring is a
steady growth, through years of debate and after numerous in-
ternational conventions and treaties, of soft law resolutions and
declarations with regard to certain human rights obligations and
standards 5.2  A reliance upon the notion of some inherent power
in a "piece of paper written over in accordance with some farci-
cal law or other made down the river" and a hope that the articu-
lation of that law will lead to the disappearance of the act pre-
vent human rights from being approached in the same way as
"hard" law.
A. Including Without Excluding
Could we handle that dumb thing, or would it handle us? I
felt how big, how confoundedly big, was that thing that
couldn't talk, and perhaps was deaf as well. 6
20. XIANFA [Constitution] art. 4 (P.R.C.) ("All nationalities in the People's Repub-
lic of China are equal .... Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality are
prohibited.").
21. Id. art. 35 ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration.").
22. Id. art. 36 ("Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of reli-
gious belief.... No state organ, public organization, or individual may compel citizens
to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citi-
zens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.").
23. Id. art. 40 ("The freedom and privacy of correspondence of citizens of the
People's Republic of China are protected by law."). In contrast to the specific provi-
sions found in the Chinese and Iranian constitutions, Article 1(2) of the German Con-
stitution simply includes the broad provision that "[tihe German people ... acknowl-
edge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human community,
of peace and of justice in the world." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 1(2) (1995)
(F.R.G.).
24. ANTHONY D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 154 (1994), quoted in
Spahn, supra note 13, at 1060 n.16 (1995).
25. Id.
26. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 43.
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How big, how confoundedly big, is the task of finding a truly
"universal" set of human rights? The Universal Declaration is an
attempt to reach some consensus as to the breadth of those core,
or "universal," human rights. 27 Presumably, "universal" human
rights are those that are "so universal that all societies, systems,
nations and ideologies could, and do, espouse them. ' 28  But
some rights declared within the Universal Declaration and other
human rights agreements may not provide a sufficient standard
of protection in states where those rights are valued more than
in others. Perhaps the notion of a "universal" set of human
rights has become so inclusive that it is unmanageable, amor-
phous, and over-broad.29
The implementation of human rights, even those clearly de-
fined in the Universal Declaration, illustrates the enormity of the
task of determining the breadth of enforceable human rights.
The core human right of democratic government, for example,
which is a fundamental element of the Universal Declaration,3
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,31 and the American Convention on
Human Rights, 3 2 seems to meet with less than universal accept-
27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, pmbl.
28. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 3.
29. See Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposalfor Quality Control,
78 Am.J. INT'L L. 607 (1984); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in Interna-
tional Law, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1110 (1982) (noting that voluminous literature has been
produced to describe expansion of new fundamental rights); see CRltA & DE BORCA,
supra note 18, at 298 (noting that identification of "commonly shared underpinnings"
in European Community, as accomplished with ECHR, is only first step, and would have
to be followed by some determination of standard of protection). The European Com-
munity is notably smaller geographically and shares more cultural similarities than
other international organizations such as the United Nations.
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 21, [ 1, 3. "Every-
one has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through
freely chosen representatives." Id. art. 21, 1. "The will of the people shall be the basis
of the authority of government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elec-
tions which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or
by equivalent free voting procedures." Id. art. 21, 3.
31. ECHR, supra note 9, pmbl., 1 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222. The ECHR reaffirms that
the fundamental freedoms dictated by the Universal Declaration "are best maintained
by... an effective political democracy." Id.
32. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 9, art. 23, 1, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, at 18, 9 I.L.M. at 682.
Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: (a) to take
part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen repre-
sentatives; [and] (b) to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections,
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ance when it comes to implementing that right. By way of illus-
tration, the Holy See of the Roman Catholic Church does not
hold periodic elections, nor does it grant universal or equal suf-
frage.3" But not surprisingly, the Vatican does not call down the
wrath of Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. Nor
does the Vatican incur any Western nation's economic sanctions
because of its facial violation of one of the foundational ele-
ments of the Universal Declaration and most other of the
world's human rights conventions. On a more pragmatic level,
and using the same core human right to illustrate, when the
U.N. Security Council approved U.S. action to enforce militarily
the democratic process in Haiti, no other major Western govern-
mentjoined the United States in enforcing the "universal" right
of democratic representation.34 The lack of universality or even
agreement with regard to the enforcement of this fundamental
human right places in doubt the legitimacy of democracy as a
"universal" human right.35
Thus, while a human right-in this case democracy-is
something that should be universally sustained, in practice the
right only appears to be sustained when it conforms with a par-
ticular state's interests. One commentator's simple hypothetical
illustrates the point. Imagine an individual who, while walking
near a shallow pond, notices a small child drowning. With mini-
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guaran-
tees the free expression of the will of the voters.
Id.
33. Many practices that facially violate "universal" human rights are admittedly
often given greater deference because of their religious significance. Even though Arti-
cle 9 of the Universal Declaration prohibits exile, the Amish practice of shunning, a
form of exile, continues without criticism, in large part because of its religious signifi-
cance, as well as because of its relative severity. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 7, art. 9. Yet the same deference has its limits. Some non-Western religious
practices, such as female circumcision, or female genital mutilation ("FGM"), are af-
forded less deference and receive much criticism in the West in general. Similarly, the
Iranian Islamic practice of Mut'a, or temporary marriages, which permits "a Muslim
man to contract an unlimited number of temporary marriages . . .in addition to his
permanent marriages," meets with equal disdain in those Western cultures that have
come to recognize a woman's individual rights of choice to a greater degree than have
some non-Western countries. Kristin J. Miller, Comment, Human Rights of Women in
Iran: The Universalist Approach and the Relativist Response, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 779, 798
(1996).
34. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 11; W. Michael Reisman, Agora: The 1994 U.S.
Action in Haiti: Haiti & the Validity of International Action, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 82, 82-83
(1995).
35. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 11.
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mum effort and the nominal cost of soiled clothing, the individ-
ual could wade into the water and save the child. Few would
doubt the individual's duty to overlook the minor inconvenience
in favor of performing a greater good.36 A similar duty may well
exist for the able international passers-by to assist in other coun-
tries where human rights are threatened by the actions of
others.37
In the United States, most U.S. citizens demonstrated a will-
ingness to wade into their backyard pond, with minimum cost, to
save democracy in Haiti.38 But clearly not all countries valued
enforcement of democracy in Haiti as much as the United States
did. The rest of the world simply did not recognize the hypo-
thetical as a good analogy. In a similar vein, many Europeans
demonstrated a willingness to wade readily into their own back-
yard pond to save Bosnia, while most U.S. citizens found the hy-
pothetical completely inapplicable.39 Within those gray areas of
balancing national interest and human rights lie the difficulties
in enforcing human rights.
As the situations in Haiti and Bosnia demonstrate, within
the West itself there is only broad agreement as to what consti-
tutes an enforceable, let alone "universal," human right. In the
European Community, for example, human rights have been in-
corporated into the broad corpus of "general principles of Com-
munity law" as those principles exist in the several member
states.4" The European Community itself, however, has leen less
than willing to adopt any kind of European Bill of Rights pre-
cisely because of a lack of harmony as to what those rights
should include.41 Similarly, in the United States the divisive
36. Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, & Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFr. 229 (1972) cited
in Lea Brilmayer, What's the Matter with Selective Intervention?, 37 Amiz. L. REv. 955, 957
(1995).
37. Brilmayer, supra note 36, at 957.
38. Id.
39. Id. One scholar has noted that "[t]he principle of defense of human rights
cannot be consistently applied in foreign policy because it can and must come in con-
flict with other interests that may be more important than the defense of human rights
in a particular instance." Hans Morgenthau, Human Rights & Foreign Policy, in STEINER
& ALSTON, supra note 8, at 814.
40. While not incorporated into any of the treaties establishing the European
Union, the human rights principles that are now general principles of European Com-
munity law have been found so by virtue of the fact that all members states within the
European Union are also signatories to the ECHR.
41. See CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 18, at 309 (stating that "there should not be
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abortion issue illustrates of the problems that arise in attempting
to define the breadth of human rights within a single country.4 2
Yet even if the world, the West, or the United States should
be able to agree upon which human rights should be enforced
and protected, that is not the same thing as determining how
those rights should be enforced and protected.43 Even if a
number of states agree that there should be protection of partic-
ular human rights, that agreement is very likely to differ from
state to state in the extent to which those rights should be pro-
tected, particularly when balanced with other national interests.
Some Western critics, for example, accuse Chinese officials
of failing to address human rights abuses adequately because the
Chinese "have failed to treat women's rights as human rights,
frequently sacrificing the rights of women to other policy goals
seen as more pressing."44 Such a condemnation is both ironic
and illustrative of the cross-cultural difficulties involved in imple-
menting any kind of "universal" human rights scheme. In this
case, while recognizing the human rights of women, Chinese of-
ficials would probably readily agree that other policy goals are
too much objection to the review of state action for compliance with those shared legal
standards and values... [but] not only is the interpretation of the meaning and scope
of such rights certain to vary from state to state, but it is far from clear that all general
principles of Community law will be shared by all states."). The European Court of
Justice's decision not to decide the human rights issue in Society for the Protection of Un-
born Chiidren Ireland, Ltd. v. Grogan demonstrates the political, religious, and cultural
charge that the gender rights debate carries among various European states. See Society
for the Protection of Unborn Children Ireland, Ltd. v. Grogan, Case C-159/90, [1991]
E.C.R. 1-4685, [1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 689. Also, within the European Community it is clear
that some Member States will accept greater restrictions than others upon individual
liberties in pursuit of other public interests. See Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case
44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42.
42. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has established a general right for a
woman to procure an abortion. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Admittedly, the
abortion right as developed by the Supreme Court is derivative of a privacy right, but
can be recognized as a fundamental right nonetheless. Various states have interpreted
that right differently, which has resulted in less-than-unanimous agreement as to the
breadth of that right among the various states. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5
(1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West 1998); Minn. Stat. § 145.411 (1998); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 125.05 (Consol. 1998).
43. See, e.g., CRAIG & DE BORCA, supra note 18, at 299 (noting difficulty in deter-
mining means of implementing agreed upon human rights even within European Com-
munity).
44. Caught Between Tradition & the State: Violation of the Human Rights of Chinese
Women, 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 285, 286 (1996); seeJulia Ernst, U.S. Ratification of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 3 MICH. J. GEN-
DER & L. 299 (1995).
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more pressing than human rights abuses because China rejects
the Western proposition that in the human rights hierarchy indi-
vidual liberties and political freedoms should be placed above
the right to national stability and communal rights of citizens as
a whole.45
In discussing different types of rights, such as Eastern social
rights as opposed to Western concepts of civil or political rights,
perhaps it is possible to take a broader, more inclusive approach.
After all, "what is meant by universality is inclusiveness of human
rights as opposed to exclusiveness, respect for cultural diversity
without falling into cultural relativism, regional efforts support-
ing the world-wide effort in favor of human rights."4 6 At the end
of the day, in our efforts to be more accommodating and inclu-
sive of other cultures' notions of human rights, we must take
care not to permit the diversity of opinions to handle us. We
cannot permit the enormity of the cultural divide to cause us to
reduce human rights to mere human notions, and thereafter to
forget the very idea of humanity altogether.
B. Which Human Rights Standard?
[F]rom the point of development we had arrived at, 'must
necessarily appear to them [savages] in the nature of super-
natural beings-we approach them with the might as of a de-
ity' . . . . 'By the simple exercise of our will we can exert a
power for good practically unbounded.'
4 7
The Universal Declaration was created precisely so that we
would not forget the very idea of humanity.48 It is founded upon
the premise that notions of human rights established in the West
should be the controlling ideals after which the rest of the
world's nations should strive. But why Western ideals?
Perhaps, at the time of the Universal Declaration's framing,
other nations saw the United Nations as the embodiment of
45. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 31.
46. Spahn, supra note 13, at 1062 (quoting Peter Leuprecht, Conflict Prevention &
Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution: Looking Towards the Twenty-First Century, in HUMAN
RIGHTS & THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 959, 963 (Kathleen E. Ma-
honey & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993)).
47. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 84.
48. The Universal Declaration was created "to promote respect for these rights and
freedoms and ... to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance."
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, pmbl.
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Western human rights ideals and recognized the United States
as a "super" nation with unbounded power and potential to ex-
ert its own will and the United Nations' will for the worldwide
good. The adoption of Western standards perhaps bespeaks
those nations' loss of confidence in their own norms in favor of
something new.4 9 A second possibility is that the Universal Dec-
laration simply reflects the balance of power following World
War II. In the post-war rebuilding years, the United States found
itself in a financially sound position relative to many of the
world's other economies and also found itself in a position to act
as a moral voice for the fledgling United Nations. Any opposi-
tion or failure to sign the Universal Declaration might have had
a detrimental effect upon the dissenting state's economic inter-
ests. Whatever the reason, the United States sees itself perched
upon the crest of a hill bearing the Western human rights torch.
By the light of that torch the United States encourages all na-
tions to give greater recognition to its brand of human rights.5"
Lost in the United States' notion of itself as the bearer of
the human rights torch is that while holding the torch, the
United States may still be in the dark. Who is to say that the
United States' interpretation of "universal" human rights is any
more correct than any other state's? The Western human rights
49. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreword: Symposium on East Asian Approaches to Human
Rights, 2 BuFF. J. INT'L L. 193, 197 (1995); see Bilhari Kausikan, An Asian Approach to
Human Rights, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 263 (1995).
50. The notion that the United States should be a beacon for all other nations
appears deeply engrained in the American psyche. Reverend John Winthrop, leader of
the Massachusetts' Bay Company, exhorted his Puritan followers: "For we must con-
sider that we shall be as a City upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us, so that if
we shall deal falsely ... in this work we have undertaken .. .we shall be made a story
and a by-word throughout the world." John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, in 1
THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 31, 41 (3d ed. 1989). Later, Justice
Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, "Our government is the potent, the omni-
present teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Former U.S. Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan referred to the United States as a "city on a hill" and pointed to
the United States' divinely appointed role: "Who but a Divine Providence could have
placed this nation here.., this newJerusalem, this shining City on a Hill." Chris Smith
& Mark Souder, Help States Fight Illegal Aliens ...But Protect Legal Immigrants, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at A17. But obviously not all U.S. citizens subscribe to this view, as
evidenced by Black Muslim Louis Farrakhan's criticism of the United States' economic
sanctions imposed upon Libya. "What gives the United States the right to impose sanc-
tions on the Libyan people?" he demanded, adding that the only right the United
States could assert was a "self-appointed" one. Farrakhan Denounces U.S. Policy in Libya,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 29, 1996.
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norm, and especially the norm most espoused by the United
States, is one built upon concepts of individual civil and political
rights."1 Other cultural traditions do not necessarily share those
same legal or moral foundations. 2 Iran, for instance, claimed
exemption in 1984 from the "universal" human rights embodied
in the Universal Declaration because the rights as interpreted
conflicted with Islamic values. 53  Consequently, Iran could not
allow itself to be judged by other states that did not share a com-
mon human rights foundation. 4 Human rights as the United
States envisions them have also met with cultural differences in
other parts of the world. In India, for example, the cultural out-
look was historically not in reference to individual rights and lib-
erties, but to individual duties.55 As one author has observed,
India was once a state in which "[e]veryone was conscious only
of his duties, there was no clamor for rights. As a result, every-
one was prone to serve others."56  Observing the infusion of
Western legally individualistic norms into the duty-minded ideal,
however, the same author noted that "[s] ince this ideal [of socie-
tal duty] is lost, enormous inequality has resulted. One lives in a
society without having any corresponding obligations to serve
51. Sharon K. Hom, Commentary: Re-positioning Human Rights Discourse on "Asian"
Perspectives, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 209, 209-10 (1996).
52. One author has pointed out that:
the attempt to impose so-called human rights upon others or to punish others
for not observing human rights assumes that human rights are of universal
validity-that, in other words, all nations or all peoples living in different na-
tions would embrace human rights if they knew they existed and that in any
event they are as inalienable in their character
as any of the Western individual civil or political rights. Morgenthau, supra note 39, at
813.
53. "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which represented secular un-
derstanding of the Judeo-Christian tradition, could not be implemented by Muslims
and did not accord with the system of values recognized by the Islamic Republic of Iran;
[Iran] would therefore not hesitate to violate its provisions." Ann E. Mayer, Universal
Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct?, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 307, 315-16 (1994) (quoting U.N. Doc. A/C.3/39/SR.65, at 95 (1984)).
54. Id. at 321 (noting that "[c]oncepts analogous to human rights have certain
precursors in the Islamic heritage of philosophy and theology, but human rights as they
are presently formulated in international law lack precise equivalents in the Islamic
legal heritage.").
55. Ajit Kumar Sengupta, Indian Constitutional Jurisprudence on Human Rights: Creat-
ing National Conditions for Development, in THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 213 (Chowdhury et al. eds., 1992).
56. Id.
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the others."57
As a final illustration of the cultural relativity involved in
human rights interpretation, in the United States there is no
right that guarantees against unemployment, starvation, or lack
of health care.5" There is, however, a freedom to voice publicly
one's concerns or grievances about those social ills.59 But in
China, Western-style human rights and individual liberties are
considered "illusory because political power and the means of
production are in the hands of the capitalists, and the system
exploits the masses."6 To many Chinese, the idea is absurd that
there should exist a right to complain about unemployment and
starvation, but that there should not exist a right to employment
and food. 61 To incorporate U.S.-style human rights into their
societal fabric would be to incorporate a flaw into their social
weave, their economic system, and their form of government.
Thus, the enforcement of human rights, whether civil or
economic, is directly related to the value placed upon the re-
spective right in the respective country. But because different
economic standards abound worldwide, and because economic
theories are equally diverse, there can be no truly universal
agreement on which economic rights can or should be recog-
nized. While the United States' posture as to civil rights in
China may largely ignore the historic and cultural basis for
China's civil rights practices, the United States has taken a well
defensible position because any attempt by China to enforce
economic rights in the United States would prove even more dif-
ficult than U.S. attempts to enforce civil rights in China. As one
commentator put it, "it is easier to tell governments that they
shall not throw persons into jail without a fair trial than that they
57. Id.
58. Goler T. Butcher, The Immediacy of International Law for Howard University Stu-
dents, 31 How. L.J. 435, 445 (1998) (noting that United States stands out as state which,
"while promoting the rights of individuals against the excesses of government, that is
civil and political rights, is opposed to a concept of a human right not to be hungry, a
right to have work, the right to education.").
59. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom
of speech .... and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
60. Jill Chiang Fung, Can Mickey Mouse Prevail in the Court of the Monkey King? En-
forcing Foreign Intellectual Property Rights in the People's Republic of China, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L
& COMp. L.J. 613, 621 (1996).
61. Robert Weil, Of Human Rights & Wrongs: China & the United States, 46
MONTHLY REv. 101 (1994).
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shall guarantee a minimum standard of living. "62
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF UNILATERAL SANCTIONS
[T]heir administration was merely a squeeze, and nothing
more, I suspect.
63
The United States sees itself as the captain of the interna-
tional human rights protection team, but has been unwilling on
many occasions to be a team player in the actual enforcement of
human rights. Rather, it demonstrates its maverick manner in
human rights enforcement in several ways. First, when the
United States chooses to enforce human rights around the
globe, it often acts unilaterally, choosing to "go it alone" with
tools such as the Helms-Burton Act64 and the Iran-Libya Sanc-
tions Act 65 instead of seeking multilateral support for the en-
forcement action.66 Second, the United States is party to many
international human rights agreements, but is not party to
others, and in so doing seems to apply one human rights stan-
dard at home and another to the rest of the world. Finally, in-
consistency in the sanctions' application undermines the United
States' ability to deal effectively with human rights abuses.
A. Holding the Torch Alone
Something like an emissary of light, something like a lower
sort of apostle.6 7
It would be difficult to dispute the extent of the United
62. Seymour J. Rubin, Economic & Social Human Rights & the New International Eco-
nomic Order, 1 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 67, 82 (1986).
63. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 9.
64. Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub.
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091
(1997)).
65. Iran & Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (1997)).
66. See Lucien J. Dhooge, Fiddling with Fidel: An Analysis of the Cuban Liberty &
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 14 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 575 (1997); Christine L.
Quickenden, Note, Helms-Burton & Canadian-American Relations at the Crossroads: The
Need for an Effective, Bilateral Cuban Policy, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 733 (1997);
Antonella Troia, Note, The Helms-Burton Controversy: An Examination of Arguments that the
Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 Violates the U.S. Obligations
Under NAFA, 23 BROOKLYNJ. INT'L L. 603 (1997); see also U.S. Unilateral Economic Sanc-
tions, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
67. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 18.
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States' overwhelming influence and leadership in the world.
That economic leadership is perhaps nowhere more evident
than in the United States' efforts to assist other states in develop-
ing their own human rights policies through economic aid and
economic sanctions. Sanctions can, in fact, be a powerful tool
for change; economic sanctions worked well enough to help
bring an end to apartheid in South Africa and may have de-
terred India and Pakistan's nuclear threat for several decades.
What is important to note is that those efforts were multilateral
efforts. A quick look at unilateral approaches to human rights
change, such as the United States' approach in Cuba, tells an-
other story. The United States has had economic sanctions in
place for nearly forty years, Fidel Castro is still in power, and
little progress has been made in the way of Cuban human rights.
In many instances, unilateral action is not only ineffective,
but also is actually a hindrance rather than a help to U.S. human
rights goals. In Burma, for instance, failure to gain multilateral
support for U.S. economic sanctions eventually led to talks that
served as a forum for bashing the United States' self-appointed
role "as the world's arbiter of human rights."6
Similarly, during the 1993-94 debacle involving China's
Most Favored Nation ("MFN") trading status, the United States
demonstrated how ineffective its unilateral human-rights-depen-
dent trade policies can be.6 9 The United States insisted that
China improve its human rights practices or else the United
States would withdraw MFN status or impose additional eco-
nomic sanctions upon China. China responded by rebuking the
United States for interfering with its domestic policies and cul-
tural ideologies. At the end of the day,. China came away with
the coveted MFN status, and the United States tacitly agreed to
wink at China's human rights policies.7v In the past, the United
States could successfully make such unilateral threats because it
was in a position of economic strength. Now that China has be-
come a world player economically, however, it is able to flout
68. Stirling, supra note 11, at 31 & nn. 217-20 (noting that after implementation of
U.S. policy to isolate Burma economically, "[n]o Asian nation would cooperate with the
United States, however, forcing it to reopen talks with Burma's leaders" and that Bur-
mese talks were "an illustration of the wildly divergent views of what constitutes essential
human rights.").
69. Id. at 1 & nn. 1-4.
70. Id.
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U.S. threats more easily and to force the United States to act
more carefully.
Besides hindering the human rights effort as in Burma, or
backfiring as in China, U.S. unilateral action can also drive away
potential support for human rights change. The United States'
position in Cuba71 and in Iran and Libya,72 for example, effec-
tively penalizes other countries that fail to go along with the
United States' unilateral sanctions. This stance lacks interna-
tional support and has resulted in friction with some of the
United States' traditionally loyal trading partners.73 Secondary
boycotts result in alienation of the United States' traditional al-
lies, who object to such unilateral measures as serious infringe-
ments of their sovereignty and violations of international law.74
In fact, shortly after passage of the Helms-Burton Act, the U.N.
General Assembly approved a non-binding resolution calling for
an end to U.S. economic measures against Cuba.75 Only the
United States, Israel, and Uzbekistan voted against the resolu-
tion. 76 The end result weakened the United States' power to
bring about change through diplomacy and leadership.
1. The Carrot and the Stick
In light of the international opposition to its unilateral
stance, the United States has begun to reconsider its unilateral
approach to human rights violations and the restrictiveness of its
unilateral sanctions such as the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act. 77 Yet this approach does not remove the
71. Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub.
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091
(1997)). The stated purpose of the Helms-Burton Act is to restore fundamental rights,
including democracy and property, upon which Fidel Castro has "trampled" over the
past 35 years. Id.; see Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1, 45-50 (1997).
72. Iran & Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (1997)).
73. See U.N. General Assembly Votes for End to Cuba Embargo, 13 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1755, 1755 (Nov. 13, 1996); Bhala, supra note 71, at 39; see also Michelle Arendt,
Note, The Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996: Isolationist Obsta-
cle to Policy of Engagement, 30 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 251 (1998); Peter L. Fitzgerald,
Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting & Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 1 (1998); Troia, supra note 66.
74. Id.
75. U.N. General Assembly Votes for End to Cuba Embargo, supra note 73, at 1755.
76. Id.
77. See Statement on US.-EU Understanding on Expropriated Property, May 18, 1998 (vis-
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fact that unilateral economic sanctions do not work as well as
expected. Another damper on the effectiveness of unilateral
sanctions is that while the United States may be doing its part to
remedy human rights ills through unilateral sanctions world-
wide, at the same time, those unilateral sanctions threaten the
United States' own economic future by giving the United States'
export markets to its foreign competitors.7" In fact, some argue
that U.S. unilateral economic sanctions deprive the United
States of some of its best tools for advancing human rights and
democracy: political and economic engagement.79 As one U.S.
businessman noted, too often unilateral economic sanctions
seem to be the United States' only tool:
When I see the list of potential (sanction) target countries,
I'm reminded of the old saying, 'When your only tool is a
hammer, every problem starts to look like a nail.' In thinking
about the effectiveness of sanctions in general, I'm inclined
to wonder if we are hitting our thumbs more often, and
harder, than the nail.80
Perhaps unilateral sanctions are too negative a solution for
every case of human rights abuse. Besides a more multilateral
approach to human rights enforcement, other tools that the
United States might consider keeping in its toolbox might in-
clude spreading investment, developing economic markets, and
otherwise creating employment opportunities around the world.
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright has realized as much:
"It's all sticks and no carrots .... If we have to sanction every
country because its religious laws do not fit America's and we
ited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980518a.html>
(on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Statement on "Iran and Libya Sanctions
Act (ILSA): Decision in the South Pars Case, "May 18, 1998 (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://
secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980518.htnl> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal); CNN, U.S., EU Settle Dispute over Trade Sanctions, May 18, 1998
(visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9805/18/eu.us/> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal). The two U.S. laws have been attacked as
being contrary to international law because they attempt to extend U.S. law extraterrito-
rially. See Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of
Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing
Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 297 (1996).
78. See U.S. Acknowledges Disarray in Sanctions Policy, supra note 3 (citing official gov-
ernment estimates of costs to U.S. economy, and particularly, export profits).
79. See, e.g., Arendt, supra note 73; Gibney, supra note 77.
80. Conoco President Speaks at Cambridge Energy Conference, PR Newswire, Feb. 11,
1997, available in WESTLAW, PR WjRE database, File No. 10:15:00.
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have to sanction every country in the world as a result of it, it
sure doesn't leave us much operating room."81 Perhaps a more
constructive course of action would be to offer positive incen-
tives to take a certain action, rather than to create disincentives
if states fail to take certain action. Indeed, one can only hope
that the United States does not awaken one day to find that it
has sanctioned itself into a corner with no bargaining power at
all. A United States without any bargaining power would be all
but impotent in the struggle for human rights.
2. Multilateral Legitimacy
One justification for the United States "going it alone" by
using punitive unilateral economic sanctions to enforce human
rights is that the United States tries to lead the world in doing
the right thing, but no one follows. The recent Gulf crisis was an
illustration of such a case of "going it alone" simply because no
one would follow.8 2 If the United States has chosen one course
of action while most of the rest of the world has chosen another,
as it has done in Haiti, however, then the "universality" of the
rights to be enforced, and indeed the rectitude of the action,
can be called into question.8" To some degree that is what ap-
pears to be occurring in Iraq, where much of the world has lost
interest in Saddam Hussein's antics. The United States, how-
ever, has declared that unilateral action on its part, if necessary,
is justified because "we are America. We are the indispensable
nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future." '8 4
But that far-reaching wisdom notwithstanding, it has been
suggested that a centralized body, such as the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO"), might better orchestrate the imposition of
economic sanctions in the protection of human rights, rather
81. Albright Criticizes U.S. Sanctions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 15, 1998 (visited Oct.
31, 1998) <http://www.usaengage.org/news/980615ap.html> (on file with the Fordham
International Law Journal).
82. The author refers to the Iraqi-Persian Gulf War of 1991. For more information
on the Iraqi-Persian Gulf War, see DILIP HiRO, DESERT SHIELD TO DESERT STORM, THE
SECOND GULF WAR (1992).
83. See discussion of U.S. intervention in Haitian elections, supra note 38 and ac-
companying text.
84. This statement is made by U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, justifying
the Clinton Administration's threat to bomb Iraq. R.C. Longworth, Like It orNot, U.S. in
Charge, CHICAGO TRIB., Apr. 12, 1998.
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than allowing states to act unilaterally.85 Often, as Iraq has
demonstrated, economic sanctions take a long time to work. An
overseeing body that has the power to police trade violations
might indeed take the softness of human rights law and give it
some bite and at the same time remove the spectre of self-inter-
ested unilateral action.86 Working in conjunction with the
United Nations, the WTO could take action, for example, after
an appropriate U.N. Security Council resolution has been
adopted, thereby ensuring international consensus to some de-
gree, which would allow for multilateral, rather than unilateral
87action.
On the other hand, using such an organization for human
rights enforcement has its drawbacks as well. The WTO was not
established to deal with human rights violations. 8 Its current
framework has no more human rights enforcement mechanisms
than does the United Nations, and there is no guarantee that the
WTO could achieve any greater success than the United Nations
in seeing universal human rights standards enforced. 9 Princi-
ples of democracy, however, can and should work on an interna-
tional as well as a national scale, particularly where the wisdom
of many can often provide greater objectivity in finding a solu-
tion than can the wisdom of one. Using organizations like the
United Nations and WTO as cooperative tools in selecting and
enforcing human rights could go a long way toward more effec-
tive multilateral enforcement of human rights.
B. Abroad but Not at Home
I arrived in a city that always makes me think of a whited sep-
ulchre .... It was the biggest thing in town, and everybody I
met was full of it. They were going to run an over-sea empire,
85. See Stirling, supra note 11; Paul H. Brietzke, Self-determination, or Jurisprudential
Confusion: Exacerbating Political Conflict, 14 Wis. INT'L LJ. 69, 127 (1995).
86. Brietzke, supra note 85, at 127.
87. Bhala, supra note 71, at 16.
88. According to the World Trade Organization ("WTO"), the legal agreements
forming the basis of the WTO have three objectives: "to help trade flow as freely as
possible, to achieve further liberalization gradually through negotiation, and to set up
an impartial means of settling disputes." WTO-About the WTO (visited Oct. 31, 1998)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/factsO.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
89. See Bhala, supra note 71, at 39 (illustrating difficulty in getting case before
WTO when human rights, trade, and national security are at issue).
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and make no end of coin by trade.9°
"Going it alone" in its enforcement efforts is not the only
troubling aspect of United States' human rights policy. The
United States' reluctance in protecting human rights through
multilateral action has led to international resentment-resent-
ment that is exacerbated by the fact that the United States read-
ily imposes economic sanctions to protect human rights abroad,
but is far less willing to suffer any judgment of its own human
rights troubles.9 This reticence often proves an impediment in
the United States' efforts to enforce human rights effectively at
all and instead gives rise to accusations of hypocrisy.9 2 The
United States operates with a curious double standard in assess-
ing other states' human rights performance and obligations and
in assessing and taking those obligations upon itself. Since the
passage of the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act,93 the U.S. State De-
partment has issued yearly country-by-country human rights re-
ports in an effort to rectify human rights difficulties worldwide.
Many of the same difficulties, however, cited in other states, that
serve as justification for the sanctions, are similar to difficulties
found in the United States itself.94 To much of the world, the
United States appears willing to judge others' difficulties while at
the same time ignoring its own problems at home. In Cuba, for
example, the United States points a finger at the Castro regime's
refusal to accept international standards for human rights,95 but
90. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 14.
91. James F. Smith, NAFTA & Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 793, 812 (1994).
92. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 28.
93. Foreign Assistance Act § 502(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1998).
94. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1997 (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/humanrights/
1997_hrpreport/china.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal)
(pointing out that in China "[t]he effects of the lack of due process are particularly
egregious in death penalty cases"). The statement is interesting in light of the fact that
in the United States more than 60 foreign citizens representing 22 nationalities wait on
death row. With few exceptions, the arresting authorities failed to notify the prisoners
of their right to communicate with consular representatives under the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (to which the United States is party). United States
of America-Violation of the Rights of Foreign Nations Under Sentence of Death (visited Oct. 31,
1998) <http://www.amnesty-usa.org/abolish/fornat.html> (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal).
95. Cuban Liberty & Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub.
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (1996) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C.A. § 6021-
6091(1997)).
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at the same time is willing to overlook its own attempts to justify
the refusal to accept international standards embodied in the
judgments of the International Court ofJustice.96 Of course the
comparison is not exact, but nonetheless, the United States must
recognize that it does not fulfill its role as unilateral human
rights enforcer with spot-free hands.97
1. The Non-self-executing Problem
The United States, like any nation, resists the idea of being
singled out and scrutinized by an international body set up to
investigate human rights violations. Largely for that reason, the
United States is absent from several important human rights
conventions such as the American Convention on Human
Rights. 8 But to those treaties to which the United States is
party, the treaty provisions are subject to a non-self-executing
policy within the United States, meaning that, pending congres-
sional incorporation of the treaty into national law, any rights
created by the treaties would be unavailable to individuals in the
United States.99 Many of these treaties are meant to be impor-
96. Nicaragua v. United States, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (1984). Nicaragua alleged that the
United States had violated the prohibition of the use of force in international relations
and the parallel rule on prohibition of intervention with the purpose of overthrowing
the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. The United States argued that the ICJ lacked
jurisdiction, but the ICJ rejected those arguments. The United States thereafter chose
not to appear at the proceedings in an attempt to stonewall the ICJ. The ICJ concluded
that the United States' non-appearance did not prevent the ICJ from giving a decision
in the case and found that the United States was required to make reparations. The
United States, however, refused, ignoring international calls for compliance with the
judgment from principal judicial arm of the United Nations. See ICJ's own recitation
of facts at Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 27June 1986 concerning military
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua: need for immediate compliance, Nov. 3,
1986 (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://www.undcp.org/webdocs/GA/GA4131.txt> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
97. See Weil, supra note 61. Weil notes the apparent Chinese double standard:
Tiananmen? How about Panama City six months later? Tibet? What about
Puerto Rico? Refusal to accept universal international standards? But the
United States itself stonewalled the World Court ruling to pay reparations to
Nicaragua. Police repression? [Who hasn't] seen Rodney King beaten on TV
and the widespread destruction that followed. Political dissidents? A short list
for the United States would have to include Leonard Peltier, Puerto Rican
independentistas, and the black victims of COINTELPRO imprisoned, mur-
dered, or driven into exile.
Id.
98. See Smith, supra note 91, at 806-07 (pointing out that of seven primary U.N.
human rights instruments, United States has consented to only three).
99. While a treaty signed by the Executive Branch is binding upon the United
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tant resources for garnering support for progressive changes in
human rights around the world.' 00 But it is precisely this kind of
''progress" that some countries resent coming from the West.
The resentment derives in part from the United States' use of
economic sanctions to force changes in human rights practices
at times supplanting cultural practices as well. 1 ' Because the
human rights conventions are non-self-executing once ratified in
the United States, their effect creates an instrument through
which certain rights are created and that is capable of being en-
forced outside the United States. The convention does not,
however, necessarily create individual privately enforceable
rights in U.S. courts for U.S. citizens. 10 2 The non-self executing
policy serves not only to immunize the United States from for-
eignjudgment, but also to prevent U.S. judges from judging per-
sons under their jurisdiction under international standards.'0 °
2. Reservations
The applicability of international conventions to U.S. citi-
zens aside, other states are quick to point out that the most pow-
erful and most active unilateral enforcer in the world is very par-
ticular about which parts of multilateral efforts it enters to pro-
tect international human rights.' 4 Where the United States is
party to human rights conventions, those conventions' full effi-
cacy is in some cases hindered because the United States partici-
States as a whole, it cannot be incorporated into the corpus of federal law, nor does it
provide a private cause of action, until it is given effect through congressional legisla-
tion. For a fuller discussion of the non-self-executing problem, see Henkin, supra note
18, at 346-50.
100. See, e.g., Ernst, supra note 44, at 323.
101. See, e.g., Rasha al-Disuqi, Family Values in Islam, in THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY IN
PERIL 33 (Susan Roylance ed., 1996) (pointing to changes from traditional role of wo-
men as nurturers implied by treaties such as Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women). Such changes could lead a woman to "aban-
don her children and run to work" thereby hindering "the children's well-being and
future." Id. at 36.
102. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (dealing with non-self-executing
problem); see also Stirling, supra note 11, at 26-27 (explaining history of non-self-execut-
ing interpretation of human rights treaties).
103. Henkin, supra note 18, at 346.
104. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 28 (explaining that United States has yet to ratify
without significant reservation American Convention on Human Rights, International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).
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pates with extensive reservations. 10 5 Indeed, the United States
sometimes walks a fine line between hypocrisy and straightfor-
ward imperialism where it seeks to enforce rights embodied in
human rights instruments that it has not ratified itself or where
it flexes its economic muscle to dictate policy to smaller develop-
ing nations.1 "6 That particularity seems to say that the United
States is willing to play the human rights game so long as it can
determine its own rules. It also seems to say that the United
States is unwilling to play the game if anyone else has a say in
how the game is played.
By way of illustration, the United States acceded to the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but did so
with reservations, refusing to prohibit capital punishment for
persons under the age of eighteen.10 7 That reservation was likely
based upon the continued cultural acceptability of capital pun-
ishment in at least thirty U.S. states and an unwillingness to
change current U.S. law to bring it in line with international
standards. In that light, where the United States has carved a
reservation for itself out of multilateral human rights agree-
ments, it can scarcely expect China, Cuba, Iran, or Libya to want
anything different, especially where they are placed under
largely unilateral pressure to bring their own practices in line
with a U.S. standard that, in many cases, is inapplicable to U.S.
citizens, themselves. The inapplicability of international stan-
dards to U.S. citizens, coupled with the United States' selective
approach to accession, has led some to criticize as hypocritical
the United States' unilateral approach to human rights enforce-
105. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 345-66 (noting that U.S. ratification of Conven-
tion Against Torture and International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination included large "packages" of reservations); Ernst, supra note 44,
at 308-21 (noting historical congressional mistrust and hostility toward international
treaties as basis for extensive reservations); see also Declaration of Rights Little Help, supra
note 15, at A5, (quoting 1997 Amnesty International Annual Report, which states that
"[e]ven when [the United States] has ratified international human-rights conventions,
it has often entered extensive reservations, refusing to be bound by many of the provi-
sions within them.").
106. Lance Compa, Labor Rights & Labor Standards in International Trade, 25 LAw &
PoL'v Ir'L Bus. 165, 170-72 (1993).
107. See Henkin, supra note 18, at 342 ("By its reservations, the United States ap-
parently seeks to assure that its adherence to a convention will not change, or require
change, in U.S. laws, policies or practices, even where they fall below international stan-
dards.").
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ment."'0 This double standard neither helps the United States'
credibility, nor its efficacy, when it comes to the unilateral en-
forcement of human rights a particular agreement is meant to
protect.
C. Inconsistency
She talked about 'weaning those ignorant millions from their
horrid ways .... "0'
The final reason for the ineffectiveness of unilateral trade
sanctions is an inconsistent pattern of human rights enforce-
ment. Once such a pattern is established with regard to certain
human rights, the threat of sanctions no longer has the weight
that it may have had before."10 The United States talks convinc-
ingly of weaning the rest of the world from their horrid ways, but
the United States' actions seem to say something else entirely.
For example, the United States' condemnation of human rights
violations in Iran is confusing in light of the considerable human
rights abuses tolerated during the Shah's pro-U.S. regime."'
Similarly, if the United States fails to pressure China on human
rights issues, or fails to remedy domestic human rights abuses,
then it undermines its ability to make credible threats elsewhere,
such as in Cuba.
To illustrate, where the United States consistently looks
away in the face of human rights abuses, such as female genital
mutilation and Chinese "family planning," and, rather, seeks to
advance its other policy objectives, then a clear paradigm is es-
tablished and the United States consequently loses any conces-
sion that it might make in order to get the support it seeks."' 2
The United States loses that credibility for several reasons, the
primary being its spectre of hypocrisy of picking and choosing
which human rights violations to enforce through economic
sanctions.
But why shouldn't the United States be selective in deter-
mining where to enforce human rights unilaterally? Some devel-
108. Id. at 341-43.
109. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 18-19.
110. See Lea Brilmayer, The Odd Advantage of Reliable Enemies, 32 HARV. INT'L LJ.
331, 337-38 (1991).
111. See Mayer, supra note 53, at 313.
112. See Brilmayer, supra note 110, at 338.
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oping nations see economic sanctions as economic strangulation
that is "yet another manifestation of imperialism, one that is
more subtle, more cunning and terrifyingly effective in prevent-
ing [those states] from exercising [their] rights as [sovereign
states] .113 Others argue that the United States is free to trade
or not to trade with whomever it desires and that economic sanc-
tions are but a part of that freedom. 14 In the minds of many
U.S. citizens, it should be up to the United States and the United
States alone to determine in which cases of human rights abuses
to become involved." 5 After all, many U.S. citizens reason that
such determinations are what democracy is all about, allowing
each state to determine its own actions, including whether to
enforce human rights in Haiti but not Bosnia, and Somalia but
not Rwanda.
If roles were reversed, however, many Americans would
likely feel differently. The idea that any state could currently im-
pose trade sanctions successfully upon the United States in order
to get it to change its human rights laws may seem outrageous
because most states would be hard-pressed to convince the
United States through economic means to rectify its own human
rights problems. For example, their current economic hardship
aside, the Asian financial powers could scarcely hope to use its
economic power to persuade the United States to do something
about its own continuing use of capital punishment. Similarly, a
European Union ("EU") boycott of U.S. goods because of the
United States' historically discriminatory approach in the treat-
ment of women would meet the same U.S. response: "It's none
of your business." This response would suffice, considering the
United States' current dominant economic and military posi-
tion, which permits it to "go it alone," and considering that the
United States would simply be unwilling to make the cultural
concession. The United States could make strides in human
rights enforcement by keeping in mind that the same cultural
constraints exist in places such as China, where attempts to im-
113. See Hartmut Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo & United States Pressure Against
Chile: Economic & Political Coercion & the Charter of the United Nations, in ECONOMIC COER-
CION & THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 293 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1976) (quot-
ing Chilean President Allende during U.S. financial and economic blockade against
Chile).
114. See Brilmayer, supra note 36, at 955.
115. Id.
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pose U.S. or Western norms in some cases amounts to an at-
tempt to make apple pie out of egg rolls.
III. SELF-DETERMINATION
What can you expect? [H]e came to them with thunder and
lightning, you know-and they had never seen anything like
it-and very terrible.' 16
No discussion of unilateral human rights policing would be
complete without some mention of self-determination. After all,
the purpose of many of the United States' unilateral sanctions is
to cause another state to change its human rights policies or
practices. Therefore, when states are faced with the thunder
and lightning of U.S. economic sanctions, things can look very
terrible indeed, because when it comes to a state's right to deter-
mine its own human rights policies, the United States' role is,
often more than merely an advisory one.
The idea of sovereign self-determination has been called
"the imperative basis for all human rights," '17 although in cer-
tain instances the right to self-determination should only be
guarded where human rights are ensured.'1 " So important is the
principle of self-determination that potential infringement of a
state's sovereignty is one of the primary reasons for the lack of
any international regime for the enforcement of human rights.
The U.N. Charter makes a point of declaring a policy of non-
intervention in "matters which are essentially within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of any state" in order to protect the fundamental
principle of state sovereignty. 119 In addition, few states desire to
bind themselves to treaties that could potentially conflict with
domestic policies and the treatment of their own citizenry. 2 '
The right to self-determination, however, is an important
116. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 94.
117. MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF DETERMINATION IN LAW & PRACTICE 41 (1982).
"Again and again the General Assembly has loudly trumpeted what has been become an
axiom in the United Nations, that self determination is the imperative basis for all
human rights." Id.
118. Id.
119. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7). Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter is invoked primarily
in response to threats of forceful intervention. A number of Third World states, how-
ever, have resisted such a narrow interpretation. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at
369.
120. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 6 (citing H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW
& HUMAN RIGHTS 175 (1968)).
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fundamental right to be considered in and of itself, even though
the right to self-determination is not necessarily a human right
recognized with any regularity by the West. 121 In fact, for some
Third World countries, the right to self-determination involves a
right to rise from poverty and third-rate status to which they see
themselves consigned by wealthy imperialists. 122 In a very real
sense, the right to self-determination is in itself a human right,
and in many of those states that recognize it as such, the quest to
improve their global status becomes an overriding goal that may
temporarily subsume other rights.'23 Other states see the impo-
sition of unilateral economic sanctions as an attempt by the
United States to impose its will upon them in violation of their
human right to self-determination. 124 They argue that to con-
centrate too much upon civil liberties is to ignore rights of na-
tional sovereignty and self-determination. 125 One commentator
has noted that "[t]he international community constantly frus-
trates the creative management of self-determination through its
unwillingness or inability effectively to sanction states that mani-
festly violate the right.' 26 Thus, while the United States has be-
come a most vocal advocate of human rights in the realm of civil
liberties around the globe, it has also become an example of
human rights violations in the realm of self-determination sim-
ply because self-determination falls below other human rights in
the United States' hierarchy of human rights enforcement.
To illustrate, one U.S. critic has pointed out that "[t]he
United States wrongly believes that the Chinese people desper-
ately demand the ouster of the leadership of the Communist
Party of China, changing the country's socialist system and intro-
ducing capitalism, or quite simply seek change.' 27 If that is in-
deed the case in China, then economic sanctions aimed at
121. One critic pointedly stated that historically, the only human rights that the
United States has consistently fought for has been the freedom from socialism and the
freedom to make a profit. Weil, supra note 61, at 14.
122. Id.
123. See Stirling, supra note 11, at 11.
124. The Chinese, for example, see such sanctions based upon human rights viola-
tions, as 'just one more attempt to 'civilize' the Chinese, right in line with the missiona-
ries, opium, and gunboats of old." Weil, supra note 61, at 6.
125. Id.
126. Brietzke, supra note 84, at 127.
127. Zhu Muzhi, Properly Evaluating China's Human Rights Conditions, 29 BElIJNG
REv., Oct. 21, 1996.
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changing Chinese behavior could well be looked at as an at-
tempt to force the state to surrender a degree of its sovereignty
to bring its actions in line with the United States' will. The
United States has not consciously sought to interfere with
China's right to self-determination; rather, it has sought to con-
vince China to realign its prioritization of human rights to bring
it into conformity with the United States' prioritization. 128
As discussed above, in balancing the right of self-determina-
tion with other human rights, there must be consistency in the
analysis. Consistency appears to be a key element in enforcing
other human rights while respecting the right to self-determina-
tion. Where the weighing of self-determination and human
rights enforcement is consistent, the use of economic coercion
can be put to most effective use.1 29 But where application of the
right of self-determination is not uniformly applied, then quite
the opposite occurs and economic sanctions lose their effect.
Often, in implementing its unilateral sanctions, the United
States lacks exactly the kind of consistency to which multilateral
action lends itself. Multilateral action tends toward greater sta-
bility in its approach, primarily because more perspectives are
called upon in making decisions.
Besides including a policy of non-intervention within the
framework of the U.N. Charter, there is established an ideal of
self-determination through freedom from forceful infringement
upon sovereignty. Indeed, the U.N. Charter requires that signa-
tories "refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state."' ° The United States would certainly arouse
international furor if it were to intervene militarily in Cuba, Iran
or Libya unilaterally-particularly in light of the aforemen-
tioned U.N. Charter provision.1 31 Whether such an action would
fall under the U.N. Charter's prohibition seems indubitable.
The U.N. Charter, however, provides the only international
standard by which "aggression" can be judged, and while the
U.N. Charter speaks clearly as to coercion by force, implying mil-
itary action, it is silent with regard to economic coercion. This
128. See Morgenthau, supra note 39, at 813-14.
129. Muzhi, supra note 127.
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
131. Id.
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silence certainly indicates that the U.N. Charter does not pro-
hibit economic sanctions outright. The spirit of the U.N. Char-
ter, however, is one of multilateral cooperation because eco-
nomic aggression today can wreak just as much havoc upon a
victim state as any military action.13 2
Such havoc is not without historic precedent, although the
roles were reversed from how they are played today. On at least
one occasion, other states have been at least somewhat successful
in placing the shoe on the other foot and imposing effective eco-
nomic or trade sanctions upon the United States. Indeed, the
United States' current stance regarding its human rights-eco-
nomic sanctions policies falls into an interesting light some
twenty-five years after it has been on the receiving end of similar
economic sanctions. In 1973 the United States suffered at the
hands of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
("OPEC") as Middle-Eastern oil-rich states cut off oil supplies to
the United States and the West to protest Arab displacement in
Israel. The response from the United States was indignation, in-
cluding cries that the embargo violated the spirit, if not the let-
ter of the U.N. Charter provisions dealing with self-determina-
tion.'33 The United States did, in fact, have some authority
under the U.N. Charter for its proposition that the use of unilat-
eral economic sanctions could be proscribed as an internally ille-
gal act of aggression.' 4 The basis for that assertion still exists.
132. The spirit of multilateral cooperation is reflected in articles 56 and 55 of the
U.N. Charter, which state that:
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in coopera-
tion with the Organization for the achievement of... (a) higher standards of
living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and
development; (b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and re-
lated problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
133. See Jordan J. Paust & Albert P. Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to
International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974). "[T]he fact that economic forms of
coercion are regulated under Chapter VII [of the U.N. Charter] supplements the ex-
pectation that the term 'force' in Article 2(4) includes measures of economic force."
Id. at 418-19 n.41. But see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legal-
ity Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 625-26 (1974) (noting that sanctions
were "following the steps of a great number of other suites which have used their export
regulations to further their foreign policies").
134. SeeJames A. Boorman, III, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil
Weapon & the Ensuing Judicial Issues, in ECONOMIC COERCION & THE NEw INTERNATIONAL
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The U.N. Charter has not been significantly altered since, and
the spirit, if not the letter of the Charter remains the same.
But while the players changed roles, fundamental economic
principles have changed little in the twenty-five years since the
United Nations proclaimed that "[e]conomic and social pro-
gress is the common and shared responsibility of the entire in-
ternational community .... Every country has the right and
duty to develop its human and natural resources, but the full
benefit of its efforts can be realized only with concomitant and
effective international action. '"13 The international community
is today even more tightly woven together economically than
ever before, and "the full benefit" of a country's development
can only be realized "with concomitant and effective interna-
tional action." This declaration still rings true, bearing in mind
that the concurrent right to self-determination seems to call for
all nations to seek multilateral cooperation in achieving their
aims, rather than simply "going it alone."
CONCLUSION
Whether he knew of this deficiency himself I can't say. I
think the knowledge came to him at last-only at the very last
.... I think it had whispered to him things about himself
which he did not know, things of which he had no concep-
tion till he took counsel with this great solitude .......
Even though the United States enjoys a great deal of promi-
nence in world affairs and its dominance seems to be at its apex,
it still has not fully grasped the importance of its role as bearer
of the human rights torch. While it proudly holds up the torch
for the rest of the world to see, behind its blindfold it fails to
recognize the peril of holding the torch alone. Certainly, the
United States should not merely sit idly by and look the other
way as human rights abuses continue around the globe. The
economic might of the United States can and should be used
toward the elimination of human rights abuses.
LEGAL ORDER, supra note 113, at 255. Admiral Boorman concludes, however, that while
such authority exists, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries embargo was
not technically illegal under international law.
135. International Development Strategy, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/139, at 3 (1970), repro-
ducing U.N. GA Res. 2625(XXV), quoted in Paust & Blaustein, supra note 132, at 421.
136. CONRAD, supra note 1, at 98.
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The human rights expressed in the Universal Declaration,
regional human rights covenants, and many states' constitutions
all seem to speak to the same goal: the eradication of human
rights abuses. They speak of similar rights and of similar needs
in order to preserve humanity. Yet underneath the varied state-
ments of lofty human rights ambitions lie fundamentally differ-
ent interpretations of those rights among various countries. The
similarities in statement of the rights notwithstanding, the differ-
ence in the weight and value placed on each respective right
does not lend itself to any real sense of universality. As one au-
thor pointed out, "whereas truth and justice were once synony-
mous with the American way," and many nations looked readily
to the United States for guidance, "many nations now recoil
from the wholesale imposition of views and policies that are
unique to America's own political interests. This is particularly
evident when American allies are expected to support U.S. ef-
forts to punish, isolate, or otherwise neutralize countries with
which the U.S. finds fault. . ". ."' Consequently, any attempt by
a country to enforce its own interpretation of a right unilaterally
upon a second country that places different weight upon the
right in question results in a battle of human rights ideals. This
result is the trouble with establishing any real framework of "uni-
versal" human rights, let alone human rights enforcement.
Even if some universally acceptable standard of human
rights enforcement can be defined with indubitable clarity, the
only truly effective enforcement mechanism can be a multilat-
eral one. Multilateral enforcement on an international scale
removes at least some of the aura of imperialism and cultural
bias that accompanies unilateral action. The United States
would be well served to seek greater multilateral consensus in
striving for enforcement of human rights. Multilateral human
rights enforcement resounds with greater authority than unilat-
eral action, and if multilateral support for enforcement does not
exist, then perhaps the United States, in contemplating the ac-
tion, should rethink its position. In rethinking its position, the
United States must be aware of the historical imperialistic and
137. Adonis Hoffman, Increasingly, U.S. Finds Itself Whistling Alone, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 13, 1996, at 18. Hoffman points out that "[s]uch has been the case with
the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, in which U.S. allies must
choose not to do business with Cuba, Iran, and Libya or open themselves up to legal
challenges in the U.S." Id.
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colonial legacy that provides room for doubt as to the West's
assertions of the "universality" of human rights and its reasons
for enforcing them. Not surprisingly, in that context, enforce-
ment of those human rights sometimes appears merely as a pre-
text for intervention into a nation's sovereign domestic affairs.13s
If the United States fails to work toward greater recognition
of human rights through multilateral efforts and instead contin-
ues to act unilaterally in its enforcement efforts then it could
find itself increasingly isolated from the international commu-
nity and the subject of increased resentment from those same
countries that it once sought to lead.
The knowledge about the United States' multilateral defi-
ciency has probably reached the ears of its subject. Perhaps the
whisperings from the wilderness have caused the United States
to learn things about itself that it did not know and had previ-
ously refused to recognize until it was faced with the potential of
great solitude. The United States is learning that unilateral eco-
nomic sanctions are not the panacea that they once seemed to
be and that economic sanctions from the United States alone
cannot cure all human rights ills.139 After years of using the
sword of unilateral economic sanctions to carry the human
rights torch into the wilderness, the U.S. State Department is
peeking from beneath its blindfold and attempting to take a
more effective, less unilateral approach. 140 The new approach, it
says, is guided by the following principles: first, economic sanc-
tions are to be used only as a last resort, after other diplomatic
138. Hom, supra note 51, at 209; see Morgenthau, supra note 39, at 814 (stating
that "there is a fundamental difference ... between the present agitation in favor of
human rights as a universal principle to be brought by the United States to the rest of
the world and the dedication to human rights as an example to be offered to other
nations"); Wilner, supra note 10, at 418-19. Wilner notes the argument that the very
standards with which the West gauges human rights "are nothing more than contempo-
rary Western values," but also clings to the "universalist" approach in pointing out that
"there are differences in certain values" even among Western states and that those dif-
ferences have not prevented the West from coming to some consensus as to core
human rights. Id. at 419.
139. Sen. John Glenn, D-Ohio, author of the 1994 measure requiring automatic
sanctions on nuclear testing violators, said on CNN that while some sanctions have been
successful, "the biggest problem is we can't unilaterally control these things around the
world." See Albright Criticizes U.S. Sanctions, supra note 81; see SusanJ. Long, Comment, A
Challenge to the Legality of Title III of LIBERTAD & an International Response, 7 IND. INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 467 (1997).
140. See Eizenstat, supra note 4.
HUMAN RIGHTS & ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
options have failed; second, before unilateral sanctions are
taken, the United States will try to seek international support;
third, economic sanctions are to be designed carefully to mini-
mize hardship upon the innocent; and finally, before sanctions
are used, views of the Congress, business groups, and others will
be considered."'
This less unilateral approach is evident in the United States'
recent agreement with the European Union'42 in which the
United States agreed both to grant waivers that will keep sanc-
tions from being imposed on European firms doing business
with Cuba, Iran, and Libya and to work with the European
Union to determine multilaterally how to deal with "unaccept-
able behavior" by other countries. 143 Such a step is a step in the
right direction if the United States seeks to preserve the effec-
tiveness of economic sanctions as well as the human rights the
sanctions are meant to protect.
Without additional multilateral action on the part of the
United States, the Universal Declaration and its progeny and the
human rights ideals for which they stand may forever remain but
descriptive statements of lofty human ambitions rather than
grounded declarations of human rights. But if the United States
truly wants to enforce human rights for altruistic reasons and not
for other economic ends, then it must seek ways to garner multi-
lateral support for its actions rather than simply "go it alone" on
the basis that it is the United States of America and is the holder
of the human rights torch. The United States may once have
been able to base its policies upon the assumption that the rest
of the world strives to share its values, but its external human
rights policies today require a much broader multilateral ap-
proach.
141. Id.
142. See Statement on US.-EU Understanding on Expropriated Property, May 18, 1998
(visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/
980518a.html> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal); Statement on "Iran
and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA): Decision in the South Pars Case, "May 18, 1998 (visited Oct.
31, 1998) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/980518.html> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
143. Statement on "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA): Decision in the South Pars
Case,"May 18, 1998, supra note 142; see CNN, U.S., EU Settle Dispute over Trade Sanctions,
May 18, 1998 (visited Oct. 31, 1998) <http://cnn.com/WORLD/europe/9805/18/
eu.us/> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal). The agreement, while hav-
ing executive support, must garner congressional approval prior to implementation.
Id.
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